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RowHammer is a circuit-level DRAM vulnerability, rst rig-
orously analyzed and introduced in 2014, where repeatedly
accessing data in a DRAM row can cause bit ips in nearby
rows. The RowHammer vulnerability has since garnered sig-
nicant interest in both computer architecture and computer
security research communities because it stems from physi-
cal circuit-level interference eects that worsen with continued
DRAM density scaling. As DRAM manufacturers primarily
depend on density scaling to increase DRAM capacity, future
DRAM chips will likely be more vulnerable to RowHammer than
those of the past. Many RowHammer mitigation mechanisms
have been proposed by both industry and academia, but it is
unclear whether these mechanisms will remain viable solutions
for future devices, as their overheads increase with DRAM’s
vulnerability to RowHammer.
In order to shed more light on how RowHammer aects mod-
ern and future devices at the circuit-level, we rst present an
experimental characterization of RowHammer on 1580 DRAM
chips (408× DDR3, 652× DDR4, and 520× LPDDR4) from 300
DRAM modules (60× DDR3, 110× DDR4, and 130× LPDDR4)
with RowHammer protection mechanisms disabled, spanning
multiple dierent technology nodes from across each of the three
major DRAMmanufacturers. Our studies denitively show that
newer DRAM chips are more vulnerable to RowHammer: as
device feature size reduces, the number of activations needed
to induce a RowHammer bit ip also reduces, to as few as 9.6k
(4.8k to two rows each) in the most vulnerable chip we tested.
We evaluate ve state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation
mechanisms using cycle-accurate simulation in the context of
real data taken from our chips to study how the mitigation
mechanisms scale with chip vulnerability. We nd that existing
mechanisms either are not scalable or suer from prohibitively
large performance overheads in projected future devices given
our observed trends of RowHammer vulnerability. Thus, it is
critical to research more eective solutions to RowHammer.
1. Introduction
DRAM is the dominant main memory technology of nearly
all modern computing systems due to its superior cost-per-
capacity. As such, DRAM critically aects overall system
performance and reliability. Continuing to increase DRAM
capacity requires increasing the density of DRAM cells by
reducing (i.e., scaling) the technology node size (e.g., feature
size) of DRAM, but this scaling negatively impacts DRAM
reliability. In particular, RowHammer [62] is an important
circuit-level interference phenomenon, closely related to tech-
nology scaling, where repeatedly activating a DRAM row
disturbs the values in adjacent rows. RowHammer can result
in system-visible bit ips in DRAM regions that are physi-
cally nearby rapidly accessed (i.e., hammered) DRAM rows.
RowHammer empowers an attacker who has access to DRAM
address X with the ability to modify data in a dierent lo-
cation Y such that X and Y are physically, but not neces-
sarily logically, co-located. In particular, X and Y must be
located in dierent DRAM rows that are in close proximity
to one another. Because DRAM is widely used throughout
modern computing systems, many systems are potentially
vulnerable to RowHammer attacks, as shown by recent works
(e.g., [21, 26, 34, 35, 50, 69, 81, 89, 99, 101, 107, 118, 121, 122, 129]).
RowHammer is a serious challenge for system designers
because it exploits fundamental DRAM circuit behavior that
cannot be easily changed. This means that RowHammer is
a potential threat across all DRAM generations and designs.
Kim et al. [62] show that RowHammer appears to be an eect
of continued DRAM technology scaling [62, 88, 90, 91], which
means that as manufacturers increase DRAM storage density,
their chips are potentially more susceptible to RowHammer.
This increase in RowHammer vulnerability is often quantied
for a given DRAM chip by measuring the number of times a
single row must be activated (i.e., single-sided RowHammer)
to induce the rst bit ip. Recently, Yang et al. [132] have
corroborated this hypothesis, identifying a precise circuit-
level charge leakage mechanism that may be responsible for
RowHammer. This leakage mechanism aects nearby circuit
components, which implies that as manufacturers continue
to employ aggressive technology scaling for generational
storage density improvements [42, 53, 85, 125], circuit com-
ponents that are more tightly packed will likely increase a
chip’s vulnerability to RowHammer.
To mitigate the impact of the RowHammer problem, numer-
ous works propose mitigation mechanisms that seek to pre-
vent RowHammer bit ips from aecting the system. These
include mechanisms to make RowHammer conditions impos-
sible or very dicult to attain (e.g., increasing the default
DRAM refresh rate by more than 7x [62], or probabilistically
activating adjacent rows with a carefully selected probabi-
lity [62]) and mechanisms that explicitly detect RowHam-
mer conditions and intervene (e.g., access counter-based ap-
proaches [57, 62, 76, 112, 113]). However, all of these solu-
tions [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 24, 25, 27, 30, 33, 38, 41, 44, 57,
61, 62, 66, 76, 77, 78, 115, 122, 126, 127, 128, 133] merely treat the
symptoms of a RowHammer attack (i.e., prevent RowHammer
conditions) without solving the core circuit vulnerability.
To better understand the problem in order to pursue more
comprehensive solutions, prior works study the RowHam-
mer failure mechanism both experimentally [62, 95, 96] and
in simulation [132]. Unfortunately, there has been no work
since the original RowHammer paper [62] that provides a
rigorous characterization-based study to demonstrate how
chips’ vulnerabilities to RowHammer (i.e., the minimum num-
ber of activations required to induce the rst RowHammer
bit ip) scale across dierent DRAM technology generations.
While many works [5, 63, 89, 90, 91] speculate that modern
chips are more vulnerable, there is no rigorous experimental
study that demonstrates exactly how the minimum activa-
tion count to induce the rst RowHammer bit ip and other
RowHammer characteristics behave in modern DRAM chips.
Such an experimental study would enable us to predict future
chips’ vulnerability to RowHammer and estimate whether
existing RowHammer mitigation mechanisms can eectively
prevent RowHammer bit ips in modern and future chips.
Our goal in this work is to experimentally demonstrate
how vulnerable modern DRAM chips are to RowHammer at
the circuit-level and to study how this vulnerability will scale
going forward. To this end, we provide a rigorous experimen-
tal characterization of 1580 DRAM chips (408× DDR3, 652×
DDR4, and 520× LPDDR4) from 300 modern DRAM modules
(60× DDR3, 110× DDR4, and 130× LPDDR4) from across all
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three major DRAM manufacturers, spanning across multiple
dierent technology node generations for each manufacturer.
To study the RowHammer vulnerability at the circuit level in-
stead of at the system level, we disable all accessible RowHam-
mer mitigation mechanisms.1 We observe that the worst-case
circuit-level RowHammer conditions for a victim row are
when we repeatedly access both physically-adjacent aggres-
sor rows as rapidly as possible (i.e., double-sided RowHam-
mer). To account for double-sided RowHammer in our study,
we dene Hammer Count (HC) as the number of times each
physically-adjacent row is activated and HCrst as the mini-
mum HC required to cause the rst RowHammer bit ip in
the DRAM chip. For each DRAM type (i.e., DDR3, DDR4,
LPDDR4), we have chips from at least two dierent tech-
nology nodes, and for each of the LPDDR4 chips, we know
the exact process technology node: 1x or 1y. This enables
us to study and demonstrate the eects of RowHammer on
two distinct independent variables: DRAM type and DRAM
technology node.
Our experiments study the eects of manipulating two key
testing parameters at a xed ambient temperature on both
aggregate and individual DRAM cell failure characteristics:
(1) hammer count (HC), and (2) data pattern written to DRAM.
Our experimental results denitively show that newer
DRAM chips manufactured with smaller technology nodes
are increasingly vulnerable to RowHammer bit ips. For ex-
ample, we nd that HCrst across all chips of a given DRAM
type reduces greatly from older chips to newer chips (e.g.,
69.2k to 22.4k in DDR3, 17.5k to 10k in DDR4, and 16.8k to
4.8k in LPDDR4 chips).2
Using the data from our experimental studies, we perform
cycle-accurate simulation to evaluate the performance over-
heads of ve state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mecha-
nisms [62, 76, 115, 133] and compare them to an ideal refresh-
based RowHammer mitigation mechanism that selectively
refreshes a row only just before it is about to experience a
RowHammer bit ip. We show that, while the state-of-the-art
mechanisms are reasonably eective at mitigating RowHam-
mer in today’s DRAM chips (e.g., 8% average performance loss
in our workloads when PARA [62] is used in a DRAM chip
with an HCrst value of 4.8k), they exhibit prohibitively large
performance overheads for projected degrees of RowHam-
mer vulnerability (i.e., lower HCrst values) in future DRAM
chips (e.g., the most-scalable existing RowHammer mitiga-
tion mechanism causes 80% performance loss when HCrst
is 128). This means that the state-of-the-art RowHammer
mitigation mechanisms are not scalable in the face of worsen-
ing RowHammer vulnerability, and DRAM-based computing
systems will either require stronger failure mitigation mech-
anisms or circuit-level modications that address the root
cause of the RowHammer vulnerability.
Our simulation results of an ideal refresh-based mitiga-
tion mechanism, which selectively refreshes only those rows
that are about to experience a RowHammer bit ip, demon-
strates signicant opportunity for developing a refresh-based
RowHammer mitigation mechanism with low performance
overhead that scales reasonably to low HCrst values. How-
ever, we observe that even this ideal mechanism signicantly
impacts overall system performance at very low HCrst values,
indicating the potential need for a better approach to solving
1We cannot disable on-die ECC in our LPDDR4 chips [53, 67, 68, 87, 97].
2While we do not denitively know the exact technology nodes used in
our DDR3/DDR4 chips, we group our chips into two sets (i.e., new and old)
based on their manufacturing dates, datasheet publication dates, purchase
dates, and distinctive RowHammer characterization results. We compare our
results against those from our LPDDR4 chips whose exact technology nodes
we know and observe the same trend of higher RowHammer vulnerability
with newer chips (that likely use smaller DRAM process technology nodes).
RowHammer in the future. We discuss directions for future
research in this area in Section 6.3.1.
We make the following contributions in this work:
• We provide the rst rigorous RowHammer failure charac-
terization study of a broad range of real modern DRAM
chips across dierent DRAM types, technology node gener-
ations, and manufacturers. We experimentally study 1580
DRAM chips (408×DDR3, 652×DDR4, and 520× LPDDR4)
from 300 DRAM modules (60× DDR3, 110× DDR4, and
130× LPDDR4) and present our RowHammer characteriza-
tion results for both aggregate RowHammer failure rates
and the behavior of individual cells while sweeping the
hammer count (HC) and stored data pattern.
• Via our rigorous characterization studies, we denitively
demonstrate that the RowHammer vulnerability signi-
cantly worsens (i.e., the number of hammers required to
induce a RowHammer bit ip, HCrst, greatly reduces) in
newer DRAM chips (e.g., HCrst reduces from 69.2k to 22.4k
in DDR3, 17.5k to 10k in DDR4, and 16.8k to 4.8k in LPDDR4
chips across multiple technology node generations).
• We demonstrate, based on our rigorous evaluation of ve
state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms, that
even though existing RowHammer mitigation mechanisms
are reasonably eective at mitigating RowHammer in to-
day’s DRAM chips (e.g., 8% average performance loss on
our workloads when HCrst is 4.8k), they will cause sig-
nicant overhead in future DRAM chips with even lower
HCrst values (e.g., 80% average performance loss with the
most scalable mechanism when HCrst is 128).
• We evaluate an ideal refresh-based mitigation mechanism
that selectively refreshes a row only just before it is about
to experience a RowHammer bit ip, and nd that in chips
with high vulnerability to RowHammer, there is still signif-
icant opportunity for developing a refresh-based RowHam-
mer mitigation mechanism with low performance overhead
that scales to low HCrst values. We conclude that it is crit-
ical to research more eective solutions to RowHammer,
and we provide promising directions for future research.
2. DRAM Background
In this section, we describe the necessary background on
DRAM organization and operation to explain the RowHam-
mer vulnerability and its implications for real systems.
For further detail, we refer the reader to prior studies on
DRAM [16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 28, 29, 39, 40, 55, 58, 62, 64, 65, 70, 71, 72,
73, 74, 75, 108, 109, 110, 111, 134].
2.1. DRAM Organization
A typical computing system includes multiple DRAM chan-
nels, where each channel has a separate I/O bus and operates
independently of the other channels in the system. As Fig-
ure 1 (left) illustrates, a memory controller can interface with
multiple DRAM ranks by time-multiplexing the channel’s I/O
bus between the ranks. Because the I/O bus is shared, the
memory controller serializes accesses to dierent ranks in
the same channel. A DRAM rank comprises multiple DRAM
chips that operate in lockstep. The combined data pins from
all chips form the DRAM data bus.
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Figure 1: A typical DRAM-based system.
DRAM Chip Organization. A modern DRAM chip con-
tains billions of cells, each of which stores a single bit of data.
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Within a chip, cells are organized hierarchically to provide
high density and performance. As Figure 1 (right) shows,
a DRAM chip is composed of multiple (e.g., 8–16 [45, 46])
DRAM banks. All banks within a chip share the internal data
and command bus.
Figure 2 (left) shows the internal organization of a DRAM
bank. A bank comprises many (e.g., 128) subarrays [18, 64].
Each subarray contains a two-dimensional array of DRAM
cells arranged in rows and columns. When accessing DRAM,
the memory controller rst provides the address of the row to
be accessed. Then, the row decoder, which is also hierarchi-
cally organized into global and local components, opens the
row by driving the corresponding wordline. DRAM cells that
are connected to the same wordline are collectively referred
to as a DRAM row. To read and manipulate a cell’s contents,
a wire (i.e., bitline) connects a column of cells to a sense am-
plier. The collection of sense ampliers in a subarray is
referred to as the local row buer. The local row buers of
the subarrays in a bank are connected to a per-bank global
row buer, which interfaces with the internal command and
data bus of the DRAM chip.
As Figure 2 (right) shows, a DRAM cell consists of an access
transistor and a capacitor. The wordline is connected to the
gate of the access transistor that, when enabled, connects the
cell capacitor to the bitline. A DRAM cell stores a single bit
of data based on the charge level of the cell capacitor (e.g.,
a charged capacitor represents a logical value of “1” and a
discharged capacitor a value of “0”, or vice versa). Unfortu-
nately, charge leaks from the storage capacitor over time due
to various charge leakage paths in the circuit components. To
ensure that the cell does not leak enough charge to cause a bit
ip, a DRAM cell needs to be periodically refreshed [82, 83].
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Figure 2: DRAM bank and cell.
2.2. DRAM Operation
A memory controller issues a sequence of DRAM com-
mands to access data in a DRAM chip. First, the memory
controller issues an activate (ACT) command to open a row
that corresponds to the memory address to be accessed. Open-
ing (i.e., activating) a DRAM row causes the data in the target
DRAM row to be copied to its corresponding local row buer.
Second, the memory controller issues either a READ or a
WRITE command to the DRAM to read out or update the
target data within the row buer, typically 32 or 64 bytes
split across all chips in the rank. The memory controller can
issue multiple consecutive READ and WRITE commands to
an open row. While a row is open, its cells remain connected
to the sense ampliers in the local row buer, so changes to
the data stored in the row buer propagate to the DRAM cells.
When accesses to the open row are complete, the memory
controller issues a precharge (PRE) command to close the open
row and prepare the bank to activate a dierent row.
DRAM Refresh. DRAM cell capacitors lose their charge
over time [82,83,106], potentially resulting in bit ips. A cell’s
retention time refers to the duration for which its capacitor
maintains the correct value. Cells throughout a DRAM chip
have dierent retention times, ranging from milliseconds to
hours [36, 37, 40, 53, 54, 56, 60, 70, 79, 82, 83, 98, 100, 123]. To
prevent data loss, the memory controller issues regular refresh
(REF) commands that ensure every DRAM cell is refreshed
at xed intervals (typically every 32 or 64 ms according to
DRAM specications [46, 47, 48]).
2.3. RowHammer: DRAM Disturbance Errors
Modern DRAM devices suer from disturbance errors that
occur when a high rate of accesses to a single DRAM row
unintentionally ip the values of cells in nearby rows. This
phenomenon is known as RowHammer [62]. It inherently
stems from electromagnetic interference between nearby
cells. RowHammer is exacerbated by reduction in pro-
cess technology node size because adjacent DRAM cells be-
come both smaller and closer to each other. Therefore, as
DRAM manufacturers continue to increase DRAM storage
density, a chip’s vulnerability to RowHammer bit ips in-
creases [62, 89, 91].
RowHammer exposes a system-level security vulnerability
that has been studied by many prior works both from the
attack and defense perspectives. Prior works demonstrate
that RowHammer can be used to mount system-level attacks
for privilege escalation (e.g., [21, 26, 34, 35, 50, 81, 99, 101, 107,
118,121,129]), leaking condential data (e.g., [69]), and denial
of service (e.g., [34,81]). These works eectively demonstrate
that a system must provide protection against RowHammer
to ensure robust (i.e., reliable and secure) execution.
Prior works propose defenses against RowHammer attacks
both at the hardware (e.g., [4,5,6,7,8,24,27,30,33,38,52,57,62,
76,103,112,115,133]) and software (e.g., [2,3,10,11,12,15,25,41,
44, 61, 62, 66, 77, 78, 122, 126, 127, 128]) levels. DRAM manufac-
turers themselves employ in-DRAM RowHammer prevention
mechanisms such as Target Row Refresh (TRR) [46], which
internally performs proprietary operations to reduce the vul-
nerability of a DRAM chip against potential RowHammer
attacks, although these solutions have been recently shown
to be vulnerable [26]. Memory controller and system manu-
facturers have also included defenses such as increasing the
refresh rate [2, 3, 77] and Hardware RHP [43, 94, 120, 124]. For
a detailed survey of the RowHammer problem, its underlying
causes, characteristics, exploits building on it, and mitigation
techniques, we refer the reader to [91].
3. Motivation and Goal
Despite the considerable research eort expended towards
understanding and mitigating RowHammer, scientic lit-
erature still lacks rigorous experimental data on how the
RowHammer vulnerability is changing with the advance-
ment of DRAM designs and process technologies. In general,
important practical concerns are dicult to address with
existing data in literature. For example:
• How vulnerable to RowHammer are future DRAM chips
expected to be at the circuit level?
• How well would RowHammer mitigation mechanisms pre-
vent or mitigate RowHammer in future devices?
• What types of RowHammer solutions would cope best
with increased circuit-level vulnerability due to continued
technology node scaling?
While existing experimental characterization studies [62, 95,
96] take important steps towards building an overall under-
standing of the RowHammer vulnerability, they are too scarce
and collectively do not provide a holistic view of RowHammer
evolution into the modern day. To help overcome this lack of
understanding, we need a unifying study of the RowHammer
vulnerability of a broad range of DRAM chips spanning the
time since the original RowHammer paper was published in
2014 [62].
To this end, our goal in this paper is to evaluate and under-
stand how the RowHammer vulnerability of real DRAM chips
at the circuit level changes across dierent chip types, manu-
facturers, and process technology node generations. Doing so
enables us to predict how the RowHammer vulnerability in
DRAM chips will scale as the industry continues to increase
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storage density and reduce technology node size for future
chip designs. To achieve this goal, we perform a rigorous
experimental characterization study of DRAM chips from
three dierent DRAM types (i.e., DDR3, DDR4, and LPDDR4),
three major DRAM manufacturers, and at least two dierent
process technology nodes from each DRAM type. We show
how dierent chips from dierent DRAM types and technol-
ogy nodes (abbreviated as “type-node” congurations) have
varying levels of vulnerability to RowHammer. We compare
the chips’ vulnerabilities against each other and project how
they will likely scale when reducing the technology node
size even further (Section 5). Finally, we study how eec-
tive existing RowHammer mitigation mechanisms will be,
based on our observed and projected experimental data on
the RowHammer vulnerability (Section 6).
4. Experimental Methodology
We describe our methodology for characterizing DRAM
chips for RowHammer.
4.1. Testing Infrastructure
In order to characterize the eects of RowHammer across
a broad range of modern DRAM chips, we experimentally
study DDR3, DDR4, and LPDDR4 DRAM chips across a
wide range of testing conditions. To achieve this, we use
two dierent testing infrastructures: (1) the SoftMC frame-
work [40, 105] capable of testing DDR3 and DDR4 DRAM
modules in a temperature-controlled chamber and (2) an in-
house temperature-controlled testing chamber capable of
testing LPDDR4 DRAM chips.
SoftMC. Figure 3 shows our SoftMC setup for testing
DDR4 chips. In this setup, we use an FPGA board with a
Xilinx Virtex UltraScale 95 FPGA [131], two DDR4 SODIMM
slots, and a PCIe interface. To open up space around the
DDR4 chips for temperature control, we use a vertical DDR4
SODIMM riser board to plug a DDR4 module into the FPGA
board. We heat the DDR4 chips to a target temperature using
silicone rubber heaters pressed to both sides of the DDR4
module. We control the temperature using a thermocouple,
which we place between the rubber heaters and the DDR4
chips, and a temperature controller. To enable fast data trans-
fer between the FPGA and a host machine, we connect the
FPGA to the host machine using PCIe via a 30 cm PCIe ex-
tender. We use the host machine to program the SoftMC
hardware and collect the test results. Our SoftMC setup for
testing DDR3 chips is similar but uses a Xilinx ML605 FPGA
board [130]. Both infrastructures provide ne-grained con-
trol over the types and timings of DRAM commands sent to
the chips under test and provide precise temperature control
at typical operating conditions.
Figure 3: Our SoftMC infrastructure [40, 105] for testing
DDR4 DRAM chips.
LPDDR4 Infrastructure. Our LPDDR4 DRAM testing
infrastructure uses industry-developed in-house testing hard-
ware for package-on-package LPDDR4 chips. The LPDDR4
testing infrastructure is further equipped with cooling and
heating capabilities that also provide us with precise temper-
ature control at typical operating conditions.
4.2. Characterized DRAM Chips
Table 1 summarizes the DRAM chips that we test using
both infrastructures. We have chips from all of the three
major DRAM manufacturers spanning DDR3, DDR4, and two
known technology nodes of LPDDR4. We refer to the DRAM
type (e.g., LPDDR4) and technology node of a DRAM chip
as a DRAM type-node conguration (e.g., LPDDR4-1x). For
DRAM chips whose technology node we do not exactly know,
we identify their node as old or new.
Table 1: Summary of DRAM chips tested.
DRAM Number of Chips (Modules) Tested
type-node Mfr. A Mfr. B Mfr. C Total
DDR3-old 56 (10) 88 (11) 28 (7) 172 (28)
DDR3-new 80 (10) 52 (9) 104 (13) 236 (32)
DDR4-old 112 (16) 24 (3) 128 (18) 264 (37)
DDR4-new 264 (43) 16 (2) 108 (28) 388 (73)
LPDDR4-1x 12 (3) 180 (45) N/A 192 (48)
LPDDR4-1y 184 (46) N/A 144 (36) 328 (82)
DDR3 and DDR4. Among our tested DDR3 modules, we
identify two distinct batches of chips based on their manu-
facturing date, datasheet publication date, purchase date, and
RowHammer characteristics. We categorize DDR3 devices
with a manufacturing date earlier than 2014 as DDR3-old
chips, and devices with a manufacturing date including and
after 2014 as DDR3-new chips. Using the same set of proper-
ties, we identify two distinct batches of devices among the
DDR4 devices. We categorize DDR4 devices with a manu-
facturing date before 2018 or a datasheet publication date of
2015 as DDR4-old chips and devices with a manufacturing
date including and after 2018 or a datasheet publication date
of 2016 or 2017 as DDR4-new chips. Based on our observa-
tions on RowHammer characteristics from these chips, we
expect that DDR3-old/DDR4-old chips are manufactured at
an older date with an older process technology compared to
DDR3-new/DDR4-new chips, respectively. This enables us
to directly study the eects of shrinking process technology
node sizes in DDR3 and DDR4 DRAM chips.
LPDDR4. For our LPDDR4 chips, we have two known
distinct generations manufactured with dierent technology
node sizes, 1x-nm and 1y-nm, where 1y-nm is smaller than
1x-nm. Unfortunately, we are missing data from some genera-
tions of DRAM from specic manufacturers (i.e., LPDDR4-1x
from manufacturer C and LPDDR4-1y from manufacturer B)
since we did not have access to chips of these manufacturer-
technology node combinations due to condentiality issues.
Note that while we know the external technology node val-
ues for the chips we characterize (e.g., 1x-nm, 1y-nm), these
values are not standardized across dierent DRAM manufac-
turers and the actual values are condential. This means that
a 1x chip from one manufacturer is not necessarily manufac-
tured with the same process technology node as a 1x chip
from another manufacturer. However, since we do know rela-
tive process node sizes of chips from the same manufacturer,
we can directly observe how technology node size aects
RowHammer on LPDDR4 DRAM chips.
4.3. Eectively Characterizing RowHammer
In order to characterize RowHammer eects on our DRAM
chips at the circuit-level, we want to test our chips at the
worst-case RowHammer conditions. We identify two condi-
tions that our tests must satisfy to eectively characterize
RowHammer at the circuit level: our testing routines must
both: 1) run without interference (e.g., without DRAM refresh
or RowHammer mitigation mechanisms) and 2) systemati-
cally test each DRAM row’s vulnerability to RowHammer
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by issuing the worst-case sequence of DRAM accesses for that
particular row.
Disabling Sources of Interference. To directly observe
RowHammer eects at the circuit level, we want to mini-
mize the external factors that may limit 1) the eectiveness of
our tests or 2) our ability to eectively characterize/observe
circuit-level eects of RowHammer on our DRAM chips.
First, we want to ensure that we have control over how our
RowHammer tests behave without disturbing the desired ac-
cess pattern in any way. Therefore, during the core loop of
each RowHammer test (i.e., when activations are issued at
a high rate to induce RowHammer bit ips), we disable all
DRAM self-regulation events such as refresh and calibration,
using control registers in the memory controller. This guar-
antees consistent testing without confounding factors due
to intermittent events (e.g., to avoid the possibility that a
victim row is refreshed during a RowHammer test routine
such that we observe fewer RowHammer bit ips). Second,
we want to directly observe the circuit-level bit ips such
that we can make conclusions about DRAM’s vulnerability
to RowHammer at the circuit technology level rather than
the system level. To this end, to the best of our knowledge,
we disable all DRAM-level (e.g., TRR [26, 46, 48]) and system-
level RowHammer mitigation mechanisms (e.g., pTRR [1])
along with all forms of rank-level error-correction codes
(ECC), which could obscure RowHammer bit ips. Unfor-
tunately, all of our LPDDR4-1x and LPDDR4-1y chips use on-
die ECC [53,67,68,87,97] (i.e., an error correcting mechanism
that corrects single-bit failures entirely within the DRAM
chip [97]), which we cannot disable. Third, we ensure that
the core loop of our RowHammer test runs for less than 32 ms
(i.e., the lowest refresh interval specied by manufacturers
to prevent DRAM data retention failures across our tested
chips [45,46,48,54,82,98]) so that we do not conate retention
failures with RowHammer bit ips.
Worst-case RowHammer Access Sequence. We leverage
three key observations from prior work [3, 20, 34, 62, 129] in
order to craft a worst-case RowHammer test pattern. First,
a repeatedly accessed row (i.e., aggressor row) has the great-
est impact on its immediate physically-adjacent rows (i.e.,
repeatedly accessing physical row N will cause the highest
number of RowHammer bit ips in physical rows N + 1 and
N – 1). Second, a double-sided hammer targeting physical
victim row N (i.e., repeatedly accessing physical rows N – 1
and N + 1) causes the highest number of RowHammer bit
ips in row N compared to any other access pattern. Third,
increasing the rate of DRAM activations (i.e., issuing the same
number of activations within shorter time periods) results in
an increasing number of RowHammer bit ips. This rate of
activations is limited by the DRAM timing parameter tRC (i.e.,
the time between two successive activations) which depends
on the DRAM clock frequency and the DRAM type: DDR3
(52.5ns) [45], DDR4 (50ns) [46], LPDDR4 (60ns) [48]. Using
these observations, we test each row’s worst-case vulnerabil-
ity to RowHammer by repeatedly accessing the two directly
physically-adjacent rows as fast as possible.
To enable the quick identication of physical rows N – 1
and N + 1 for a given row N , we reverse-engineer the undoc-
umented and condential logical-to-physical DRAM-internal
row address remapping. To do this, we exploit RowHammer’s
key observation that repeatedly accessing an arbitrary row
causes the two directly physically-adjacent rows to contain
the highest number of RowHammer bit ips [62]. By repeat-
ing this analysis across rows throughout the DRAM chip, we
can deduce the address mappings for each type of chip that
we test. We can then use this mapping information to quickly
test RowHammer eects at worst-case conditions. We note
that for our LPDDR4-1x chips from Manufacturer B, when
we repeatedly access a single row within two consecutive
rows such that the rst row is an even row (e.g., rows 2 and
3) in the logical row address space as seen by the memory
controller, we observe 1) no RowHammer bit ips in either
of the two consecutive rows and 2) a near equivalent number
of RowHammer bit ips in each of the four immediately ad-
jacent rows: the two previous consecutive rows (e.g., rows 0
and 1) and the two subsequent consecutive rows (e.g., rows
4 and 5). This indicates a row address remapping that is in-
ternal to the DRAM chip such that every pair of consecutive
rows share the same internal wordline. To account for this
DRAM-internal row address remapping, we test each row
N in LPDDR4-1x chips from manufacturer B by repeatedly
accessing physical rows N – 2 and N + 2.
Additional Testing Parameters. To investigate RowHam-
mer characteristics, we explore two testing parameters at a
stable ambient temperature of 50◦C:
1. Hammer count (HC). We test the eects of changing the
number of times we access (i.e., activate) a victim row’s
physically-adjacent rows (i.e., aggressor rows). We count
each pair of activations to the two neighboring rows as
one hammer (e.g., one activation each to rows N – 1 and
N +1 counts as one hammer). We sweep the hammer count
from 2k to 150k (i.e., 4k to 300k activations) across our
chips so that the hammer test runs for less than 32ms.
2. Data pattern (DP). We test several commonly-used
DRAM data patterns where every byte is written with
the same data: Solid0 (SO0: 0x00), Solid1 (SO1: 0xFF), Col-
stripe0 (CO0: 0x55), Colstripe1 (CO1: 0xAA) [54,82,98]. In
addition, we test data patterns where each byte in every
other row, including the row being hammered, is written
with the same data, Checkered0 (CH0: 0x55) or Rowstripe0
(RS0: 0x00), and all other rows are written with the inverse
data, Checkered1 (CH1: 0xAA) or Rowstripe1 (RS1: 0xFF),
respectively.
RowHammer Testing Routine. Algorithm 1 presents the
general testing methodology we use to characterize RowHam-
mer on DRAM chips. For dierent data patterns (DP) (line 2)
and hammer counts (HC) (line 8), the test individually tar-
gets each row in DRAM (line 4) as a victim row (line 5). For
each victim row, we identify the two physically-adjacent
rows (aggressor_row1 and aggressor_row2) as aggressor rows
(lines 6 and 7). Before beginning the core loop of our
RowHammer test (Lines 11-13), two things happen: 1) the
memory controller disables DRAM refresh (line 9) to ensure
no interruptions in the core loop of our test due to refresh
operations, and 2) we refresh the victim row (line 10) so that
we begin inducing RowHammer bit ips on a fully-charged
row, which ensures that bit ips we observe are not due to
retention time violations. The core loop of our RowHammer
test (Lines 11-13) induces RowHammer bit ips in the victim
row by rst activating aggressor_row1 then aggressor_row2,
Algorithm 1: DRAM RowHammer Characterization
1 DRAM_RowHammer_Characterization():
2 foreach DP in [Data Patterns]:
3 write DP into all cells in DRAM
4 foreach row in DRAM:
5 set victim_row to row
6 set aggressor_row1 to victim_row – 1
7 set aggressor_row2 to victim_row + 1
8 foreach HC in [HC sweep]:
9 Disable DRAM refresh
10 Refresh victim_row
11 for n = 1→ HC: // core test loop
12 activate aggressor_row1
13 activate aggressor_row2
14 Enable DRAM refresh
15 Record RowHammer bit ips to storage
16 Restore bit ips to original values
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HC times. After the core loop of our RowHammer test, we
re-enable DRAM refresh (line 14) to prevent retention failures
and record the observed bit ips to secondary storage (line 15)
for analysis (presented in Section 5). Finally, we prepare to
test the next HC value in the sweep by restoring the observed
bit ips to their original values (Line 16) depending on the
data pattern (DP) being tested.
Fairly Comparing Data Across Infrastructures. Our
carefully-crafted RowHammer test routine allows us to com-
pare our test results between the two dierent testing infras-
tructures. This is because, as we described earlier, we 1) re-
verse engineer the row address mappings of each DRAM con-
guration such that we eectively test double-sided RowHam-
mer on every single row, 2) issue activations as fast as possible
for each chip, such that the activation rates are similar across
infrastructures, and 3) disable all sources of interference in
our RowHammer tests.
5. RowHammer Characterization
In this section, we present our comprehensive character-
ization of RowHammer on the 1580 DRAM chips (listed in
Appendix Tables 7 and 8) we test.
5.1. RowHammer Vulnerability
We rst examine which of the chips that we test are sus-
ceptible to RowHammer. Across all of our chips, we sweep
the hammer count (HC) between 2K and 150K (i.e., 4k and
300k activates for our double-sided RowHammer test) and
observe whether we can induce any RowHammer bit ips at
all in each chip. We nd that we can induce RowHammer bit
ips in all chips except many DDR3 chips. Table 2 shows the
fraction of DDR3 chips in which we can induce RowHammer
bit ips (i.e., RowHammerable chips).
Table 2: Fraction of DDR3 DRAM chips vulnerable to
RowHammer when HC< 150k.
DRAM RowHammerable chips
type-node Mfr. A Mfr. B Mfr. C
DDR3-old 24/88 0/88 0/28
DDR3-new 8/72 44/52 96/104
Observation 1. Newer DRAM chips appear to be more
vulnerable to RowHammer based on the increasing fraction
of RowHammerable chips from DDR3-old to DDR3-new DRAM
chips of manufacturers B and C.
We nd that the fraction of manufacturer A’s chips that
are RowHammerable decreases from DDR3-old to DDR3-new
chips, but we also note that the number of RowHammer bit
ips that we observe across each of manufacturer A’s chips
is very low (< 20 on average across RowHammerable chips)
compared to the number of bit ips found in manufacturer B
and C’s DDR3-new chips (87k on average across RowHam-
merable chips) when HC = 150K . Since DDR3-old chips of
all manufacturers and DDR3-new chips of manufacturer A
have very few to no bit ips, we refrain from analyzing and
presenting their characteristics in many plots in Section 5.
5.2. Data Pattern Dependence
To study data pattern eects on observable RowHam-
mer bit ips, we test our chips using Algorithm 1 with
hammer_count (HC) = 150k at 50◦C, sweeping the 1)
victim_row and 2) data_pattern (as described in Section 4.3).3
We rst examine the set of all RowHammer bit ips that
we observe when testing with dierent data patterns for a
given HC. For each data pattern, we run our RowHammer test
routine ten times. We then aggregate all unique RowHammer
3Note that for a given data pattern (DP), the same data is always writ-
ten to victim_row. For example, when testing Rowstripe0, every byte in
victim_row is always written with 0x00 and every byte in the two physically-
adjacent rows are written with 0xFF.
bit ips per data pattern. We combine all unique RowHam-
mer bit ips found by all data patterns and iterations into a
full set of observable bit ips. Using the combined data, we
calculate the fraction of the full set of observable bit ips that
each data pattern identies (i.e., the data pattern’s coverage).
Figure 4 plots the coverage (y-axis) per individual data pat-
tern (shared x-axis) for a single representative DRAM chip
from each DRAM type-node conguration that we test. Each
row of subplots shows the coverages for chips of the same
manufacturer (indicated on the right y-axis), and the columns
show the coverages for chips of the same DRAM type-node
conguration (e.g., DDR3-new).
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Figure 4: RowHammer bit ip coverage of dierent data pat-
terns (described in Section 4.3) for a single representative
DRAM chip of each type-node conguration.
Observation 2. Testing with dierent data patterns is es-
sential for comprehensively identifying RowHammer bit ips
because no individual data pattern achieves full coverage alone.
Observation 3. The worst-case data pattern (shown in Ta-
ble 3) is consistent across chips of the same manufacturer and
DRAM type-node conguration.4
Table 3: Worst-case data pattern for each DRAM type-node
conguration at 50◦C split into dierent manufacturers.
DRAM Worst Case Data Pattern at 50◦C
type-node Mfr. A Mfr. B Mfr. C
DDR3-new N/A Checkered0 Checkered0
DDR4-old RowStripe1 RowStripe1 RowStripe0
DDR4-new RowStripe0 RowStripe0 Checkered1
LPDDR4-1x Checkered1 Checkered0 N/A
LPDDR4-1y RowStripe1 N/A RowStripe1
We believe that dierent data patterns induce the most
RowHammer bit ips in dierent chips because DRAM manu-
facturers apply a variety of proprietary techniques for DRAM
cell layouts to maximize the cell density for dierent DRAM
type-node congurations. For the remainder of this paper, we
characterize each chip using only its worst-case data pattern.5
5.3. Hammer Count (HC) Eects
We next study the eects of increasing the hammer count
on the number of observed RowHammer bit ips across our
chips. Figure 5 plots the eects of increasing the number of
4We do not consider the true/anti cell pattern of a chip [26, 62, 82] and
agnostically program the data pattern accordingly into the DRAM array.
More RowHammer bit ips can be induced by considering the true/anti-cell
pattern of each chip and devising corresponding data patterns to exploit this
knowledge [26].
5We use the worst-case data pattern to 1) minimize the extensive testing
time, 2) induce many RowHammer bit ips, and 3) experiment at worst-case
conditions. A diligent attacker would also try to nd the worst-case data
pattern to maximize the probability of a successful RowHammer attack.
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hammers on the RowHammer bit ip rate6 for our tested
DRAM chips of various DRAM type-node congurations
across the three major DRAM manufacturers. For all chips, we
hammer each row, sweeping HC between 10,000 and 150,000.
For each HC value, we plot the average rate of observed
RowHammer bit ips across all chips of a DRAM type-node
conguration.
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Figure 5: Hammer count (HC) vs. RowHammer bit ip rate
across DRAM type-node congurations.
Observation 4. The log of the number of RowHammer bit
ips has a linear relationship with the log of HC.7
We observe this relationship between HC and RowHammer
bit ip rate because more accesses to a single row results in
more cell-to-cell interference, and therefore more charge is
lost in victim cells of nearby rows.
We examine the eects of DRAM technology node on the
RowHammer bit ip rate in Figure 5. We observe that the
bit ip rate curve shifts upward and leftward when going
from DDR4-old to DDR4-new chips, indicating respectively,
1) a higher rate of bit ips for the same HC value and 2)
occurrence of bit ips at lower HC values, as technology
node size reduces from DDR4-old to DDR4-new.
Observation 5. Newer DDR4 DRAM technology nodes show
a clear trend of increasing RowHammer bit ip rates: the same
HC value causes an increased average RowHammer bit ip
rate from DDR4-old to DDR4-new DRAM chips of all DRAM
manufacturers.
We believe that due to increased density of DRAM chips
from older to newer technology node generations, cell-to-cell
interference increases and results in DRAM chips that are
more vulnerable to RowHammer bit ips.
5.4. RowHammer Spatial Eects
We next experimentally study the spatial distribution of
RowHammer bit ips across our tested chips. In order to
normalize the RowHammer eects that we observe across
our tested chips, we rst take each DRAM chip and use a
hammer count specic to that chip to result in a RowHammer
bit ip rate of 10–6.8 For each chip, we analyze the spatial
distribution of bit ips throughout the chip. Figure 6 plots the
fraction of RowHammer bit ips that occur in a given row
oset from the victim_row out of all observed RowHammer
bit ips. Each column of subplots shows the distributions for
chips of dierent manufacturers and each row of subplots
shows the distribution for a dierent DRAM type-node con-
guration. The error bars show the standard deviation of the
distribution across our tested chips. Note that the repeatedly-
accessed rows (i.e., aggressor rows) are at x = 1 and x = –1
for all plots except in LPDDR4-1x chips from manufacturer B,
where they are at x = –2 and x = 2 (due to the internal address
remapping that occurs in these chips as we describe in Sec-
tion 4.3). Because an access to a row essentially refreshes the
data in the row, repeatedly accessing aggressor rows during
the core loop of the RowHammer test prevents any bit ips
from happening in the aggressor rows. Therefore, there are
no RowHammer bit ips in the aggressor rows across each
6We dene the RowHammer bit ip rate as the number of observed
RowHammer bit ips to the total number of bits in the tested DRAM rows.
7Our observation is consistent with prior work [96].
8We choose a RowHammer bit ip rate of 10–6 since we are able to
observe this bit ip rate in most chips that we characterize with HC < 150k.
DRAM chip in our plots (i.e., y = 0 for x = [–2, –1, 2, 3] for
LPDDR4-1x chips from manufacturer B and for x = 1 and
x = –1 for all other chips).
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Figure 6: Distribution of RowHammer bit ips across row
osets from the victim row.
We make three observations from Figure 6. First, we ob-
serve a general trend across DRAM type-node congurations
of a given DRAM manufacturer where newer DRAM tech-
nology nodes have an increasing number of rows that are
susceptible to RowHammer bit ips that are farther from the
victim row. For example, in LPDDR4-1y chips, we observe
RowHammer bit ips in as far as 6 rows from the victim row
(i.e., x = –6), whereas in DDR3 and DDR4 chips, RowHam-
mer bit ips only occur in as far as 2 rows from the victim
row (i.e., x = –2). We believe that this eect could be due
to 1) an increase in DRAM cell density, which leads to cell-
to-cell interference extending farther than a single row, with
RowHammer bit ips occurring in rows increasingly farther
away from the aggressor rows (e.g., 5 rows away) for higher-
density chips, and 2) more shared structures internal to the
DRAM chip, which causes farther (and multiple) rows to be
aected by circuit-level interference.
Observation 6. For a given DRAM manufacturer, chips of
newer DRAM technology nodes can exhibit RowHammer bit
ips 1) in more rows and 2) farther away from the victim row.
Second, we observe that rows containing RowHammer bit
ips that are farther from the victim row have fewer RowHam-
mer bit ips than rows closer to the victim row. Non-victim
rows adjacent to the aggressor rows (x = 2 and x = –2) con-
tain RowHammer bit ips, and these bit ips demonstrate the
eectiveness of a single-sided RowHammer attack as only one
of their adjacent rows are repeatedly accessed. As discussed
earlier (Section 4.3), the single-sided RowHammer attack is
not as eective as the double-sided RowHammer attack, and
therefore we nd fewer bit ips in these rows. In rows far-
ther away from the victim row, we attribute the diminishing
number of RowHammer bit ips to the diminishing eects of
cell-to-cell interference with distance.
Observation 7. The number of RowHammer bit ips that
occur in a given row decreases as the distance from the victim
row increases.
Third, we observe that only even-numbered osets from
the victim row contain RowHammer bit ips in all chips
except LPDDR4-1x chips from Manufacturer B. However,
the rows containing RowHammer bit ips in Manufacturer
B’s LPDDR4-1x chips would be even-numbered osets if we
translate all rows to physical rows based on our observation
in Section 4.3 (i.e., divide each row number by 2 and round
down). While we are uncertain why we observe RowHammer
bit ips only in physical even-numbered osets from the
7
victim row, we believe that it may be due to the internal
circuitry layout of DRAM rows.
We next study the spatial distribution of RowHammer-
vulnerable DRAM cells in a DRAM array using the same set
of RowHammer bit ips. Figure 7 shows the distribution of
64-bit words containing x RowHammer bit ips across our
tested DRAM chips. We nd the proportion of 64-bit words
containing x RowHammer bit ips out of all 64-bit words in
each chip containing any RowHammer bit ip and plot the
distribution as a bar chart with error bars for each x value.
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Figure 7: Distribution of the number ofRowHammer bit ips
per 64-bit word for each DRAM type-node conguration.
Observation 8. At a RowHammer bit ip rate of 10–6, a
single 64-bit value can contain up to four RowHammer bit ips.
Because ECC [53, 87, 93, 97] is typically implemented for
DRAM at a 64-bit granularity (e.g., a single-error correcting
code would only protect a 64-bit word if it contains at most
one error), observation 8 indicates that even at a relatively
low bit ip rate of 10–6, a DRAM chip can only be protected
from RowHammer bit ips with a strong ECC code (e.g., 4-bit
error correcting code), which has high hardware overhead.
Observation 9. The distribution of RowHammer bit ip
density per word changes signicantly in LPDDR4 chips com-
pared to other DRAM types.
We nd DDR3 and DDR4 chips across all manufacturers to
exhibit an exponential decay curve for increasing RowHam-
mer bit ip densities with most words containing only one
RowHammer bit ip. However, LPDDR4 chips across all
manufacturers exhibit a much smaller fraction of words con-
taining a single RowHammer bit ip and signicantly larger
fractions of words containing two and three RowHammer
bit ips compared to DDR3 and DDR4 chips. We believe
this change in the bit ip density distribution is due to the
on-die ECC that manufacturers have included in LPDDR4
chips [53,87,93,97], which is a 128-bit single-error correcting
code that corrects and hides most single-bit failures within a
128-bit ECC word using redundant bits (i.e., parity-check bits)
that are hidden from the system.
With the failure rates at which we test, many ECC words
contain several bit ips. This exceeds the ECC’s correction
strength and causes the ECC logic to behave in an undened
way. The ECC logic may 1) correct one of the bit ips, 2) do
nothing, or 3) introduce an additional bit ip by corrupting
an error-free data bit [97, 116]. On-die ECC makes single-bit
errors rare because 1) any true single-bit error is immediately
corrected and 2) a multi-bit error can only be reduced to a
single-bit error when there are no more than two bit ips
within the data bits and the ECC logic’s undened action
happens to change the bit ip count to exactly one. In contrast,
there are many more scenarios that yield two or three bit-
ips within the data bits, and a detailed experimental analysis
of how on-die ECC aects DRAM failure rates in LPDDR4
DRAM chips can be found in [97].
5.5. First RowHammer Bit Flips
We next study the vulnerability of each chip to RowHam-
mer. One critical component of vulnerability to the double-
sided RowHammer attack [62] is identifying the weakest cell,
i.e., the DRAM cell that fails with the fewest number of ac-
cesses to physically-adjacent rows. In order to perform this
study, we sweep HC at a ne granularity and record the HC
that results in the rst RowHammer bit ip in the chip (HCrst).
Figure 8 plots the distribution of HCrst across all tested chips
as box-and-whisker plots.9 The subplots contain the distri-
butions of each tested DRAM type-node conguration for
the dierent DRAM manufacturers. The x-axis organizes the
distributions by DRAM type-node conguration in order of
age (older on the left to younger on the right). We further
subdivide the subplots for chips of the same DRAM type (e.g.,
DDR3, DDR4, LPDDR4) with vertical lines. Chips of the same
DRAM type are colored with the same color for easier visual
comparison across DRAM manufacturers.
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Figure 8: Number of hammers required to cause the rst
RowHammer bit ip (HCrst ) per chip across DRAM type-
node congurations.
Observation 10. Newer chips from a given DRAM man-
ufacturer appear to be more vulnerable to RowHammer bit
ips. This is demonstrated by the clear reduction in HCrst val-
ues from old to new DRAM generations (e.g., LPDDR4-1x to
LPDDR4-1y in manufacturer A, or DDR4-old to DDR4-new in
manufacturers A and C).
We believe this observation is due to DRAM technology
process scaling wherein both 1) DRAM cell capacitance re-
duces and 2) DRAM cell density increases as technology node
size reduces. Both factors together lead to more interference
between cells and likely faster charge leakage from the DRAM
cell’s smaller capacitors, leading to a higher vulnerability to
RowHammer. We nd two exceptions to this trend (i.e., a
general increase in HCrst from DDR3-old to DDR3-new chips
of manufacturer A and from DDR4-old to DDR4-new chips
of manufacturer B), but we believe these potential anomalies
may be due to our inability to identify explicit manufacturing
dates and correctly categorize these particular chips.
9A box-and-whiskers plot emphasizes the important metrics of a
dataset’s distribution. The box is lower-bounded by the rst quartile (i.e., the
median of the rst half of the ordered set of data points) and upper-bounded
by the third quartile (i.e., the median of the second half of the ordered set of
data points). The median falls within the box. The inter-quartile range (IQR)
is the distance between the rst and third quartiles (i.e., box size). Whiskers
extend an additional 1.5× IQR on either sides of the box. We indicate outliers,
or data points outside of the range of the whiskers, with pluses.
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Observation 11. In LPDDR4-1y chips frommanufacturer A,
there are chips whose weakest cells fail after only 4800 hammers.
This observation has serious implications for the future
as DRAM technology node sizes will continue to reduce and
HCrst will only get smaller. We discuss these implications
further in Section 6. Table 4 shows the lowest observed HCrst
value for any chip within a DRAM type-node conguration
(i.e., the minimum values of each distribution in Figure 8).
Table 4: LowestHCrst values (×1000) across all chips of each
DRAM type-node conguration.
DRAM HCrst (Hammers until rst bit ip) ×1000
type-node Mfr. A Mfr. B Mfr. C
DDR3-old 69.2 157 155
DDR3-new 85 22.4 24
DDR4-old 17.5 30 87
DDR4-new 10 25 40
LPDDR4-1x 43.2 16.8 N/A
LPDDR4-1y 4.8 N/A 9.6
Eects of ECC. The use of error correcting codes (ECC) to
improve the reliability of a DRAM chip is common practice,
with most system-level [9, 21, 31, 59] or on-die [53, 67, 68,
87, 97] ECC mechanisms providing single error correction
capabilities at the granularity of 64- or 128-bit words. We
examine 64-bit ECCs since, for the same correction capability
(e.g., single-error correcting), they are stronger than 128-bit
ECCs. In order to determine the ecacy with which ECC
can mitigate RowHammer eects on real DRAM chips, we
carefully study three metrics across each of our chips: 1)
the lowest HC required to cause the rst RowHammer bit
ip (i.e., HCrst) for a given chip (shown in Figure 8), 2) the
lowest HC required to cause at least two RowHammer bit
ips (i.e., HCsecond) within any 64-bit word, and 3) the lowest
HC required to cause at least three RowHammer bit ips (i.e.,
HCthird) within any 64-bit word. These quantities tell us, for
ECCs of varying strengths (e.g., single-error correction code,
double-error correction code), at which HC values the ECC
can 1) mitigate RowHammer bit ips and 2) no longer reliably
mitigate RowHammer bit ips for that particular chip.
Figure 9 plots as a bar graph the HC (left y-axis) required
to nd the rst 64-bit word containing one, two, and three
RowHammer bit ips (x-axis) across each DRAM type-node
conguration. The error bars represent the standard deviation
of HC values across all chips tested. On the same gure,
we also plot with red boxplots, the increase in HC (right y-
axis) between the HCs required to nd the rst 64-bit word
containing one and two RowHammer bit ips, and two and
three RowHammer bit ips. These multipliers indicate how
HCrst would change in a chip if the chip uses single-error
correcting ECC or moves from a single-error correcting to
a double-error correcting ECC. Note that we 1) leave two
plots (i.e., Mfr. A DDR3-new and Mfr. C DDR4-old) empty
since we are unable to induce enough RowHammer bit ips
to nd 64-bit words containing more than one bit ip in the
chips and 2) do not include data from our LPDDR4 chips
because they already include on-die ECC [53, 67, 68, 87, 97],
which obfuscates errors potentially exposed to any other ECC
mechanisms [97].
Observation 12. A single-error correcting code can sig-
nicantly improve HCrst by up to 2.78× in DDR4-old and
DDR4-new DRAM chips, and 1.65× in DDR3-new DRAM chips.
Observation 13. Moving from a double-error correcting
code to a triple-error correcting code has diminishing returns
in DDR4-old and DDR4-new DRAM chips (as indicated by the
reduction in the HC multiplier) compared to when moving
from a single-error correcting code to a double-error correcting
code. However, using a triple-error correcting code in DDR3-new
DRAM chips continues to further improve the HCrst and thus
reduce the DRAM chips’ vulnerability to RowHammer.
Mfr. A Mfr. B Mfr. C
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
0k
50k
100k
150k
200k
0k
50k
100k
150k
200k
0k
50k
100k
150k
200k
Ha
m
m
er
 C
ou
nt
 (H
C)
 to
 fi
nd
 th
e 
fir
st
 

64
-b
it 
wo
rd
 c
on
ta
ini
ng
 X
 b
it 
flip
s
Ham
m
er Count M
ultiplier
DDR3-new
DDR4-old
DDR4-new
Number of RowHammer bit flips in a 64-bit word
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Not Enough  
Bit Flips
Not Enough  
Bit Flips
Mfr. A Mfr. B Mfr. C
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
0k
50k
100k
150k
200k
0k
50k
100k
150k
200k
0k
50k
100k
150k
200k
Ha
m
m
er
 C
ou
nt
 (H
C)
 to
 fi
nd
 th
e 
fir
st
 

64
-b
it 
wo
rd
 c
on
ta
ini
ng
 X
 b
it 
flip
s
Ham
m
er Count M
ultiplier
DDR3-new
DDR4-old
DDR4-new
Number of RowHammer bit flips in a 64-bit word
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Not Enough  
Bit Flips
Not Enough  
Bit Flips
Figure 9: Hammer Count (left y-axis) required to nd the
rst 64-bit word containing one, two, and three RowHammer
bit ips. Hammer Count Multiplier (right y-axis) quanties
the HC dierence between every two points on the x-axis (as
a multiplication factor of the left point to the right point).
5.6. Single-Cell RowHammer Bit Flip Probability
We examine how the failure probability of a single
RowHammer bit ip changes as HC increases. We sweep
HC between 25k to 150k with a step size of 5k and hammer
each DRAM row over 20 iterations. For each HC value, we
identify each cell’s bit ip probability (i.e., the number of
times we observe a RowHammer bit ip in that cell out of
all 20 iterations). We then observe how each cell’s bit ip
probability changes as HC increases. We expect that by ex-
acerbating the RowHammer conditions (e.g., increasing the
hammer count), the exacerbated circuit-level interference
eects should result in an increasing RowHammer bit ip
probability for each individual cell. Out of the full set of
bits that we observe any RowHammer bit ips in, Table 5
lists the percentage of cells that have a strictly monotonically
increasing bit ip probability as we increase HC.
Table 5: Percentage of cells with monotonically increasing
RowHammer bit ip probabilities as HC increases.
DRAM
type-node
Cells with monotonically increasing
RowHammer bit ip probabilities (%)
Mfr. A Mfr. B Mfr. C
DDR3-new 97.6± 0.2 100 100
DDR4-old 98.4± 0.1 100 100
DDR4-new 99.6± 0.1 100 100
LPDDR4-1x 50.3± 1.2 52.4± 1.4 N/A
LPDDR4-1y 47.0± 0.8 N/A 54.3± 5.7
Observation 14. For DDR3 and DDR4 chips, an overwhelm-
ing majority (i.e., more than 97%) of the cells tested have mono-
tonically increasing RowHammer bit ip probabilities for DDR3
and DDR4 chips.
This observation indicates that exacerbating the RowHam-
mer conditions by increasing HC increases the probability
that a DRAM cell experiences a RowHammer bit ip. How-
ever, we nd that the proportion of cells with monotonically
increasing RowHammer bit ip probabilities as HC increases
is around only 50% in the LPDDR4 chips that we test. We
believe that this decrease is due to the addition of on-die ECC
in LPDDR4 chips, which can obscure the probability of ob-
serving a RowHammer bit ip from the system’s perspective
in two ways. First, a RowHammer bit ip at bit X can no
longer be observable from the system’s perspective if another
RowHammer bit ip at bit Y occurs within the same ECC
word as a result of increasing HC, and the error correction
logic corrects the RowHammer bit ip at bit X. Second, the
system may temporarily observe a bit ip at bit X at a specic
HC if the set of real RowHammer bit ips within an ECC
word results in a miscorrection at bit X. Since this bit ip is a
result of the ECC logic misbehaving rather than circuit-level
interference, we do not observe the expected trends for these
transient miscorrected bits.
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6. Implications for Future Systems
Our characterization results have major implications for
continued DRAM technology scaling since DRAM’s increased
vulnerability to RowHammer means that systems employing
future DRAM devices will likely need to handle signicantly
elevated failure rates. While prior works propose a wide vari-
ety of RowHammer failure mitigation techniques (described
in Sections 6.1 and 7), these mechanisms will need to manage
increasing failure rates going forward and will likely suer
from high overhead (as we show in Section 6.2).
While DRAM and system designers currently implement
several RowHammer mitigation mechanisms (e.g., pseudo Tar-
get Row Refresh (pTRR) [51], Target Row Refresh (TRR) [80])10,
the designers make a number of unknown implementation
choices in these RowHammer mitigation mechanisms that
are not discussed in public documentation. Therefore, we
cannot fairly evaluate how their performance overheads scale
as DRAM chips become more vulnerable to RowHammer. In-
stead, we evaluate ve state-of-the-art academic proposals
for RowHammer mitigation mechanisms [62, 76, 115, 133] as
well as an ideal refresh-based mitigation mechanism.
We evaluate each RowHammer mitigation mechanism in
terms of two major challenges that they will face going for-
ward as they will need to support DRAM chips more vul-
nerable to RowHammer: design scalability and system per-
formance overhead. We rst qualitatively explain and dis-
cuss the ve state-of-the-art mitigation mechanisms and how
they can potentially scale to support DRAM chips that are
more vulnerable to RowHammer. We then quantitatively
evaluate their performance overheads in simulation as HCrst
decreases. In order to show the opportunity for reducing
performance overhead in RowHammer mitigation, we also
implement and study an ideal refresh-based mechanism that
prevents RowHammer by refreshing a DRAM row only im-
mediately before it is about to experience a bit ip.
6.1. RowHammer Mitigation Mechanisms
There is a large body of work (e.g., [3,10,11,15,27,34,44,61,
66, 78, 122, 127, 128]) that proposes software-based RowHam-
mer mitigation mechanisms. Unfortunately, many of these
works have critical weaknesses (e.g., inability to track all
DRAM activations) that make them vulnerable to carefully-
crafted RowHammer attacks, as demonstrated in some fol-
lowup works (e.g., [34]). Therefore, we focus on evaluating
six mechanisms (i.e., ve state-of-the-art hardware proposals
and one ideal refresh-based mitigation mechanism), which ad-
dress a strong threat model that assumes an attacker can cause
row activations with precise memory location and timing in-
formation. We briey explain each mitigation mechanism
and how its design scales for DRAM chips with increased
vulnerability to RowHammer (i.e., lower HCrst values).
Increased Refresh Rate [62]. The original RowHammer
study [62] describes increasing the overall DRAM refresh
rate such that it is impossible to issue enough activations
within one refresh window (i.e., the time between two con-
secutive refresh commands to a single DRAM row) to any
single DRAM row to induce a RowHammer bit ip. The study
notes that this is an undesirable mitigation mechanism due to
its associated performance and energy overheads. In order to
reliably mitigate RowHammer bit ips with this mechanism,
we scale the refresh rate such that the refresh window (i.e.,
tREFW ; the time interval between consecutive refresh com-
mands to a single row) equals the number of hammers until
the rst RowHammer bit ip (i.e., HCrst) multiplied by the
activation latency tRC . Due to the large number of rows that
10Frigo et al. [26] recently demonstrated that these mechanisms do not
prevent all RowHammer bit ips from being exposed to the system, and an
attacker can still take over a system even with these mechanisms in place.
must be refreshed within a refresh window, this mechanism
inherently does not scale to HCrst values below 32k.
PARA [62]. Every time a row is opened and closed, PARA
(Probabilistic Adjacent Row Activation) refreshes one or more
of the row’s adjacent rows with a low probability p. Due to
PARA’s simple approach, it is possible to easily tune p when
PARA must protect a DRAM chip with a lower HCrst value.
In our evaluation of PARA, we scale p for dierent values
of HCrst such that the bit error rate (BER) does not exceed
1e-15 per hour of continuous hammering.11
ProHIT [115]. ProHIT maintains a history of DRAM ac-
tivations in a set of tables to identify any row that may be
activated HCrst times. ProHIT manages the tables proba-
bilistically to minimize the overhead of tracking frequently-
activated DRAM rows. ProHIT [115] uses a pair of tables
labeled "Hot" and "Cold" to track the victim rows. When a
row is activated, ProHIT checks whether each adjacent row is
already in either of the tables. If a row is not in either table, it
is inserted into the cold table with a probability pi . If the table
is full, the least recently inserted entry in the cold table is then
evicted with a probability (1 – pe) + pe/(#cold_entries) and the
other entries are evicted with a probability pe/(#cold_entries).
If the row already exists in the cold table, the row is promoted
to the highest-priority entry in the hot table with a proba-
bility (1 – pt ) + pt/(#hot_entries) and to other entries with a
probability pt/(#hot_entries). If the row already exists in the
hot table, the entry is upgraded to a higher priority position.
During each refresh command, ProHIT simultaneously re-
freshes the row at the top entry of the hot table, since this
row has likely experienced the most number of activations,
and then removes the entry from the table.
For ProHIT [115] to eectively mitigate RowHammer with
decreasing HCrst values, the size of the tables and the prob-
abilities for managing the tables (e.g., pi, pe , pt ) must be
adjusted. Even though Son et al. show a low-cost mitiga-
tion mechanism for a specic HCrst value (i.e., 2000), they
do not provide models for appropriately setting these values
for arbitrary HCrst values and how to do so is not intuitive.
Therefore, we evaluate ProHIT only when HCrst = 2000.
MRLoc [133]. MRLoc refreshes a victim row using a proba-
bility that is dynamically adjusted based on each row’s access
history. This way, according to memory access locality, the
rows that have been recorded as a victim more recently have
a higher chance of being refreshed. MRLoc uses a queue to
store victim row addresses on each activation. Depending on
the time between two insertions of a given victim row into
the queue, MRLoc adjusts the probability with which it issues
a refresh to the victim row that is present in the queue.
MRLoc’s parameters (the queue size and the parameters
used to calculate the probability of refresh) are tuned for
HCrst = 2000. You et al. [133] choose the values for these
parameters empirically, and there is no concrete discussion on
how to adjust these parameters as HCrst changes. Therefore
we evaluate MRLoc for only HCrst = 2000.
As such, even though we quantitatively evaluate both Pro-
HIT [115] and MRLoc [133] for completeness and they may
seem to have good overhead results at one data point, we are
unable to demonstrate how their overheads scale as DRAM
chips become more vulnerable to RowHammer.
TWiCe [76]. TWiCe tracks the number of times a victim
row’s aggressor rows are activated using a table of counters
and refreshes a victim row when its count is above a threshold
such that RowHammer bit ips cannot occur. TWiCe uses
two counters per entry: 1) a lifetime counter, which tracks
the length of time the entry has been in the table, and 2)
an activation counter, which tracks the number of times an
11We adopt this BER from typical consumer memory reliability tar-
gets [13, 14, 49, 84, 86, 98].
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aggressor row is activated. The key idea is that TWiCe can
use these two counters to determine the rate at which a row
is being hammered and can quickly prune entries that have
a low rate of being hammered. TWiCe also minimizes its
table size based on the observation that the number of rows
that can be activated enough times to induce RowHammer
failures within a refresh window is bound by the DRAM
chip’s vulnerability to RowHammer.
When a row is activated, TWiCe checks whether its adja-
cent rows are already in the table. If so, the activation count
for each row is incremented. Otherwise, new entries are allo-
cated in the table for each row. Whenever a row’s activation
count surpasses a threshold tRH dened as HCrst/4, TWiCe
refreshes the row. TWiCe also denes a pruning stage that 1)
increments each lifetime counter, 2) checks each row’s ham-
mer rate based on both counters, and 3) prunes entries that
have a lifetime hammer rate lower than a pruning threshold,
which is dened as tRH divided by the number of refresh op-
erations per refresh window (i.e., tRH /(tREFW /tREFI )). TWiCe
performs pruning operations during refresh commands so
that the latency of a pruning operation is hidden behind the
DRAM refresh commands.
If tRH is lower than the number of refresh intervals in a
refresh window (i.e., 8192), a couple of complications arise in
the design. TWiCe either 1) cannot prune its table, resulting
in a very large table size since every row that is accessed at
least once will remain in the table until the end of the refresh
window or 2) requires oating point operations in order to
calculate thresholds for pruning, which would signicantly
increase the latency of the pruning stage. Either way, the
pruning stage latency would increase signicantly since a
larger table also requires more time to check each entry, and
the latency may no longer be hidden by the refresh command.
As a consequence, TWiCe does not support tRH values
lower than the number of refresh intervals in a refresh win-
dow (∼ 8k in several DRAM standards, e.g., DDR3, DDR4,
LPDDR4). This means that in its current form, we can-
not fairly evaluate TWiCe for HCrst values below 32k, as
tRH =HCrst/4. However, we do evaluate an ideal version of
TWiCe (i.e., TWiCe-ideal) for HCrst values below 32k assum-
ing that TWiCe-ideal solves both issues of the large table size
and the high-latency pruning stage at lower HCrst values.
Ideal Refresh-based Mitigation Mechanism. We im-
plement an ideal refresh-based mitigation mechanism that
tracks all activations to every row in DRAM and issues a
refresh command to a row only right before it can potentially
experience a RowHammer bit ip (i.e., when a physically-
adjacent row has been activated HCrst times).
6.2. Evaluation of Viable Mitigation Mechanisms
We rst describe our methodology for evaluating the ve
state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms (i.e.,
increased refresh rate [62], PARA [62], ProHIT [115], MR-
Loc [133], TWiCe [76]) and the ideal refresh-based mitigation
mechanism.
6.2.1. Evaluation Methodology. We use Ramulator [65,
104], a cycle-accurate DRAM simulator with a simple core
model and a system conguration as listed in Table 6, to imple-
ment and evaluate the RowHammer mitigation mechanisms.
To demonstrate how the performance overhead of each mech-
anism would scale to future devices, we implement, to the
best of our ability, parameterizable methods for scaling the
mitigation mechanisms to DRAM chips with varying degrees
of vulnerability to RowHammer (as described in Section 6.1).
Workloads. We evaluate 48 8-core workload mixes drawn
randomly from the full SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite [117]
to demonstrate the eects of the RowHammer mitigation
mechanisms on systems during typical use (and not when a
RowHammer attack is being mounted). The set of workloads
Table 6: System conguration for simulations.
Parameter Conguration
Processor 4GHz, 8-core, 4-wide issue, 128-entry instr. window
Last-level Cache 64-Byte cache line, 8-way set-associative, 16MB
Memory Controller 64 read/write request queue, FR-FCFS [102, 135]
Main Memory DDR4, 1-channel, 1-rank, 4-bank groups, 4-banksper bank group, 16k rows per bank
exhibit a wide range of memory intensities. The workloads’
MPKI values (i.e., last-level cache misses per kilo-instruction)
range from 10 to 740. This wide range enables us to study the
eects of RowHammer mitigation on workloads with widely
varying degrees of memory intensity. We note that there
could be other workloads with which mitigation mechanisms
exhibit higher performance overheads, but we did not try
to maximize the overhead experienced by workloads by bi-
asing the workload construction in any way. We simulate
each workload until each core executes at least 200 million
instructions. For all congurations, we initially warm up the
caches by fast-forwarding 100 million instructions.
Metrics. Because state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation
mechanisms rely on additional DRAM refresh operations to
prevent RowHammer, we use two dierent metrics to evalu-
ate their impact on system performance. First, we measure
DRAM bandwidth overhead, which quanties the fraction of
the total system DRAM bandwidth consumption coming from
the RowHammer mitigation mechanism. Second, we measure
overall workload performance using the weighted speedup
metric [23, 114], which eectively measures job throughput
for multi-core workloads [23]. We normalize the weighted
speedup to its baseline value, which we denote as 100%, and
nd that when using RowHammer mitigation mechanisms,
most values appear below the baseline. Therefore, for clar-
ity, we refer to normalized weighted speedup as normalized
system performance in our evaluations.
6.2.2. Evaluation of Mitigation Mechanisms. Figure 10
shows the results of our evaluation of the RowHammer miti-
gation mechanisms (as described in Section 6.1) for chips of
varying degrees of RowHammer vulnerability (i.e., 200k ≥
HCrst≥ 64) for our two metrics: 1) DRAM bandwidth over-
head in Figure 10a and 2) normalized system performance in
Figure 10b. Each data point shows the average value across
48 workloads with minimum and maximum values drawn as
error bars.
For each DRAM type-node conguration that we charac-
terize, we plot the minimum HCrst value found across chips
within the conguration (from Table 4) as a vertical line to
show how each RowHammer mitigation mechanism would
impact the overall system when using a DRAM chip of a
particular conguration. Above the gures (sharing the x-
axis with Figure 10), we draw horizontal lines representing
the ranges of HCrst values that we observe for every tested
DRAM chip per DRAM type-node conguration across manu-
facturers. We color the ranges according to DRAM type-node
conguration colors in the gure, and indicate the average
value with a gray point. Note that these lines directly corre-
spond to the box-and-whisker plot ranges in Figure 8.
We make ve key observations from this gure. First,
DRAM bandwidth overhead is highly correlated with nor-
malized system performance, as DRAM bandwidth consump-
tion is the main source of system interference caused by
RowHammer mitigation mechanisms. We note that several
points (i.e., ProHIT, MRLoc, and TWiCe and Ideal evaluated
at higher HCrst values) are not visible in Figure 10a since
we are plotting an inverted log graph and these points are
very close to zero. Second, in the latest DRAM chips (i.e.,
the LPDDR4-1y chips), only PARA, ProHIT, and MRLoc are
viable options for mitigating RowHammer bit ips with rea-
sonable average normalized system performance: 92%, 100%,
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Figure 10: Eect of RowHammer mitigation mechanisms on
a) DRAM bandwidth overhead (note the inverted log-scale
y-axis) and b) system performance, as DRAM chips become
more vulnerable to RowHammer (from left to right).
and 100%, respectively. Increased Refresh Rate and TWiCe
do not scale to such degrees of RowHammer vulnerability
(i.e., HCrst = 4.8k), as discussed in Section 6.1. Third, only
PARA’s design scales to low HCrst values that we may see
in future DRAM chips, but has very low average normalized
system performance (e.g., 72% when HCrst = 1024; 47% when
HCrst = 256; 20% when HCrst = 128). While TWiCe-ideal
has higher normalized system performance over PARA (e.g.,
98% when HCrst = 1024; 86% when HCrst = 256; 73% when
HCrst = 128), there are signicant practical limitations in
enabling TWiCe-ideal for such low HCrst values (discussed
in Section 6.1). Fourth, ProHIT and MRLoc both exhibit high
normalized system performance at their single data point (i.e.,
95% and 100%, respectively when HCrst = 2000), but these
works do not provide models for scaling their mechanisms
to lower HCrst values and how to do so is not intuitive (as
described in Section 6.1). Fifth, the ideal refresh-based mitiga-
tion mechanism is signicantly and increasingly better than
any existing mechanism as HCrst reduces below 1024. This
indicates that there is still signicant opportunity for develop-
ing a refresh-based RowHammer mitigation mechanism with
low performance overhead that scales to low HCrst values.
However, the ideal mechanism aects system performance
at very low HCrst values (e.g., 99.96% when HCrst = 1024;
97.91% when HCrst = 256; 93.53% when HCrst = 128), indi-
cating the potential need for a better approach to solving
RowHammer in future ultra-dense DRAM chips.
We conclude that while existing mitigation mechanisms
may exhibit reasonably small performance overheads for mit-
igating RowHammer bit ips in modern DRAM chips, their
overheads do not scale well in future DRAM chips that will
likely exhibit higher vulnerability to RowHammer. Thus,
we need new mechanisms and approaches to RowHammer
mitigation that will scale to DRAM chips that are highly vul-
nerable to RowHammer bit ips.
6.3. RowHammer Mitigation Going Forward
DRAM manufacturers continue to adopt smaller technol-
ogy nodes to improve DRAM storage density and are fore-
casted to reach 1z and 1a technology nodes within the next
couple of years [119]. Unfortunately, our ndings show that
future DRAM chips will likely be increasingly vulnerable to
RowHammer. This means that, to maintain market competi-
tiveness without suering factory yield loss, manufacturers
will need to develop eective RowHammer mitigations for
coping with increasingly vulnerable DRAM chips.
6.3.1. Future Directions in RowHammer Mitigation.
RowHammer mitigation mechanisms have been proposed
across the computing stack ranging from circuit-level mecha-
nisms built into the DRAM chip itself to system-level mecha-
nisms that are agnostic to the particular DRAM chip that the
system uses. Of these solutions, our evaluations in Section 6.1
show that, while the ideal refresh-based RowHammer mitiga-
tion mechanism, which inserts the minimum possible num-
ber of additional refreshes to prevent RowHammer bit ips,
scales reasonably well to very low HCrst values (e.g., only 6%
performance loss when HCrst is 128), existing RowHammer
mitigation mechanisms either cannot scale or cause severe
system performance penalties when they scale.
To develop a scalable and low-overhead mechanism that
can prevent RowHammer bit ips in DRAM chips with a high
degree of RowHammer vulnerability (i.e., with a low HCrst
value), we believe it is essential to explore all possible avenues
for RowHammer mitigation. Going forward, we identify two
promising research directions that can potentially lead to new
RowHammer solutions that can reach or exceed the scalability
of the ideal refresh-based mitigation mechanism: (1) DRAM-
system cooperation and (2) prole-guided mechanisms. The
remainder of this section briey discusses our vision for each
of these directions.
DRAM-System Cooperation. Considering either DRAM-
based or system-level mechanisms alone ignores the potential
benets of addressing the RowHammer vulnerability from
both perspectives together. While the root causes of RowHam-
mer bit ips lie within DRAM, their negative eects are ob-
served at the system-level. Prior work [88, 92] stresses the
importance of tackling these challenges at all levels of the
stack, and we believe that a holistic solution can achieve a
high degree of protection at relatively low cost compared to
solutions contained within either domain alone.
Prole-GuidedMechanisms. The ability to accurately pro-
le for RowHammer-susceptible DRAM cells or memory re-
gions can provide a powerful substrate for building targeted
RowHammer solutions that eciently mitigate RowHammer
bit ips at low cost. Knowing (or eectively predicting) the lo-
cations of bit ips before they occur in practice could lead to a
large reduction in RowHammer mitigation overhead, provid-
ing new information that no known RowHammer mitigation
mechanism exploits today. For example, within the scope
of known RowHammer mitigation solutions, increasing the
refresh rate can be made far cheaper by only increasing the
refresh rate for known-vulnerable DRAM rows. Similarly,
ECC or DRAM access counters can be used only for known-
vulnerable cells, and even a software-based mechanism can
be adapted to target only known-vulnerable rows (e.g., by
disabling them or remapping them to reliable memory).
Unfortunately, there exists no such eective RowHammer
error proling methodology today. Our characterization in
this work essentially follows the naïve approach of individu-
ally testing each row by attempting to induce the worst-case
testing conditions (e.g., HC, data pattern, ambient tempera-
ture etc.). However, this approach is extremely time consum-
ing due to having to test each row individually (potentially
multiple times with various testing conditions). Even for a
relatively small DRAM module of 8GB with 8KB rows, ham-
mering each row only once for only one refresh window of
64ms requires over 17 hours of continuous testing, which
means that the naïve approach to proling is infeasible for a
general mechanism that may be used in a production environ-
ment or for online operation. We believe that developing a
fast and eective RowHammer proling mechanism is a key
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research challenge, and we hope that future work will use
the observations made in this study and other RowHammer
characterization studies to nd a solution.
7. Related Work
Although many works propose RowHammer attacks and
mitigation mechanisms, only three works [62, 95, 96] provide
detailed failure-characterization studies that examine how
RowHammer failures manifest in real DRAM chips. However,
none of these studies show how the number of activations
to induce RowHammer bit ips is changing across modern
DRAM types and generations, and the original RowHammer
study [62] is already six years old and limited to DDR3 DRAM
chips only. This section highlights the most closely related
prior works that study the RowHammer vulnerability of older
generation chips or examine other aspects of RowHammer.
Real Chip Studies. Three key studies (i.e., the pioneering
RowHammer study [62] and two subsequent studies [95, 96])
perform extensive experimental RowHammer failure charac-
terization using older DDR3 devices. However, these studies
are restricted to only DDR3 devices and do not provide a
scaling study of hammer counts across DRAM types and gen-
erations. In contrast, our work provides the rst rigorous
experimental study showing how RowHammer characteris-
tics scale across dierent DRAM generations and how DRAM
chips designed with newer technology nodes are increas-
ingly vulnerable to RowHammer. Our work complements
and furthers the analyses provided in prior studies.
Simulation Studies. Yang et al. [132] use device-level
simulations to explore the root cause of the RowHammer vul-
nerability. While their analysis identies a likely explanation
for the failure mechanism responsible for RowHammer, they
do not present experimental data taken from real devices to
support their conclusions.
RowHammer Mitigation Mechanisms. Many prior
works [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 24, 25, 30, 33, 38, 41, 44,
57, 61, 62, 66, 76, 77, 78, 115, 122, 126, 127, 128, 133] propose
RowHammer mitigation techniques. Additionally, several
patents for RowHammer prevention mechanisms have been
led [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 32]. However, these works do not analyze
how their solutions will scale to future DRAM generations
and do not provide detailed failure characterization data from
modern DRAM devices. Similar and other related works on
RowHammer can be found in a recent retrospective [91].
8. Conclusion
We provide the rst rigorous experimental RowHammer
failure characterization study that demonstrates how the
RowHammer vulnerability of modern DDR3, DDR4, and
LPDDR4 DRAM chips scales across DRAM generations and
technology nodes. Using experimental data from 1580 real
DRAM chips produced by the three major DRAM manufac-
turers, we show that modern DRAM chips that use smaller
process technology node sizes are signicantly more vul-
nerable to RowHammer than older chips. Using simulation,
we show that existing RowHammer mitigation mechanisms
1) suer from prohibitively large performance overheads at
projected future hammer counts and 2) are still far from an
ideal selective-refresh-based RowHammer mitigation mecha-
nism. Based on our study, we motivate the need for a scalable
and low-overhead solution to RowHammer and provide two
promising research directions to this end. We hope that the
results of our study will inspire and aid future work to de-
velop ecient solutions for the RowHammer bit ip rates we
are likely to see in DRAM chips in the near future.
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A. Tables
Table 7: Sample population of 110 DDR4 DRAMmodules, categorized by manufacturer and sorted by manufacture date.
Manufacturer Tech. Node Module Date(yy-ww)
Timing Organization
Minimum HCrstGeneration Freq.(MT/s)
tRC
(ns)
Size
(GB) Chips Pins (x1000)
old A0–15 17-08 2133 47.06 4 8 x8 17.5
A16–18 19-19 2400 46.16 4 4 x16 12.5
A19–24 19-36 2666 46.25 4 4 x16 10
A25–33 19-45 2666 46.25 4 4 x16 10
A34–36 19-51 2133 46.5 8 8 x8 10new
A37–46 20-07 2400 46.16 8 8 x8 12.5
A47–58 20-08 2133 46.5 4 8 x8 10
A
old B0–2 N/A 2133 46.5 4 8 x8 30
new B3–4 N/A 2133 46.5 4 8 x8 25B
C0–7 16-48 2133 46.5 4 8 x8 147.5
C8–17 17-12 2133 46.5 4 8 x8 87old
C45 19-01 2400 45.75 8 8 x8 54
C44 19-06 2400 45.75 8 8 x8 63
C34 19-11 2400 45.75 4 4 x16 62.5
C35–36 19-23 2400 45.75 4 4 x16 63
C37–43 19-44 2133 46.5 8 8 x8 57.5
new
C18–27 19-48 2400 45.75 8 8 x8 52.5
C
C28–33 N/A 2666 46.5 4 8 x4 40
Table 8: Sample population of 60 DDR3 DRAMmodules, categorized by manufacturer and sorted by manufacture date.
Manufacturer Tech. Node Module Date(yy-ww)
Timing Organization
Minimum HCrstGeneration Freq.(MT/s)
tRC
(ns)
Size
(GB) Chips Pins (x1000)
A0 10-19 1066 50.625 1 8 x8 155
A1 10-40 1333 49.5 2 8 x8 N/A
A2–6 12-11 1866 47.91 2 8 x8 156old
A7–9 12-32 1600 48.75 2 8 x8 69.2
A10–16 14-16 1600 48.75 4 8 x8 85
A17–18 14-26 1600 48.75 2 4 x16 160new
A19 15-23 1600 48.75 8 16 x4 155
A
B0–1 10-48 1333 49.5 1 8 x8 N/A
B2–4 11-42 1333 49.5 2 8 x8 N/A
B5–6 12-24 1600 48.75 2 8 x8 157old
B7–10 13-51 1600 48.75 4 8 x8 N/A
B11–14 15-22 1600 50.625 4 8 x8 33.5new B15–19 15-25 1600 48.75 2 4 x16 22.4
B
old C0–6 10-43 1333 49.125 1 4 x16 155
C7 15-04 1600 48.75 4 8 x8 N/A
C8–12 15-46 1600 48.75 2 8 x8 33.5C new
C13–19 17-03 1600 48.75 4 8 x8 24
15
